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NOTES
REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO PENAL INMATES FOR INJURIES
RECEIVED WHILE INCARCERATED
Lawful incarceration of a prisoner by the state results in the with-
drawal or retraction of many privileges and rights. Such retraction,
however, must be justified by the considerations underlying our penal
system.' Historically, penal inmates in the United States were con-
sidered to be "slaves of the state."2  Although this "slave" status has
been gradually changed' by modern thought and practice,4 the problem
of enforcing discipline and obedience to authority among unruly convicts
still remains.' While the penal inmate loses his liberty and must comply
with strict disciplinary rules and regulations, he does not lose the right
to personal security from unlawful invasion. The problem to be dealt
with in this study is the determination of to what degree civil remedies
for injuries to a prisoner have been granted in an effort to preserve the
rights of the prisoner while, at the same time, maintaining prison dis-
cipline and order.'
The most difficult obstacle to overcome before a suit may be pur-
sued successfully against any governmental unit is the sovereign im-
munity doctrine. Prisoners, as well as ordinary citizens, who are injured
by the state are confronted with the common law theory that "The King
1. Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1952).
2. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt. 790 (Va. 1871).
3. Westbrook v. State, 133 Ga. 587, 66 S.E. 429 (1909).
4. The sociological concept of the modern day penal system differs greatly from
that which was followed in this country during the nineteenth century. Today the pur-
pose of such a program is not only to punish the offender, but also to rehabilitate him
so that he may once again resume his normal place in society. Since ninety-five percent
of all those who were once incarcerated will some day be returned to society, the
treatment accorded them while imprisoned is all the more important.
5. State v. Mincher, 172 N.C. 895, 90 S.E. 429 (1916).
6. An interesting sidelight to this study is presented by the international law
concerning compensation to war prisoners for injuries which they received during their
internment. The Hague Convention Concerning Prisoners of War emphasized that such
prisoners retained their civil rights. However, it had serious flaws in that it failed
to provide for the liability of employers and for the compensation of those injured.
By 1917 both Germany and France had classified injured prisoners as though injured
in battle and hence entitled to similar compensation. The Geneva Conference entitled
prisoners injured while employed in industry to the workmen's compensation of the
detaining power. All major powers with the exception of Russia and Japan adopted
these principles. The United States informed Japan that this country would comply
with these regulations with all war prisoners and civilian enemy aliens interned in the
United States during World War II. International Law Concerning Accidents To War
Prisoners Employed In Private Enterprises, 36 Am. J. INTIL L. 294 (1942).
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can do no wrong, therefore the King cannot be sued."' Under this doc-
trine no liability arises because of the tortious conduct of those acting
in behalf of the state.
To avoid this prohibition to suit, the injured plaintiff must rely up-
on statutory provisions waiving the sovereign immunity of the state.
The most prominent statute breaching the sovereign immunity doctrine
is the Federal Tort Claims Act.8 By the enactment of this legislation
Congress waived the sovereign immunity of the federal government un-
der certain circumstances. However, through a study of court interpre-
tations of this legislation, it is readily ascertainable that recourse to
prisoners for penal inflicted injuries is not included within the terms of
the act as interpreted.
The leading case of Siginon v. United States9 involved a prisoner
who sought damages as a result of an injury received while operating
a faulty emery wheel within a prison workshop. The court held that it
was not the intent of Congress to include prisoners within the terms of
the Federal Tort Claims Act for several reasons.
First, the court argued that it was the intent of Congress to include
only the normal run of tort cases against ordinary people, and if pris-
oners were allowed to avail themselves of the provisions of the act, a
"new and novel procedure"'" would be established. The court specified
that it could not "impute to Congress such a radical departure from the
established law in the absence of express Congressional demand."" This
argument failed to take into consideration the fact that the entire act
itself was "novel." Congress did not establish or "demand" specific
areas in which liability would exist, but rather established a general
policy and then made specific exceptions thereto.
Second, the act specifies that "the United States shall be liable . . .
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances." 2 Consequently, the court reasoned that since a
private individual has no right to hold another in penal servitude, an in-
jured prisoner would never find himself under like circumstances and
hence could not avail himself of the provisions of the act.
Third, the act also makes liability dependent upon the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred. The court held that since there
7. Alvord v. Village of Richmond, 3 Ohio N.P. 136 (1896).
8. 62 Stat. 933-84, 28 U.S.C. § 1346-2680 (1948).
9. 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953). See also Shew v. United States, 116 F. Supp.
1 (M.D.N.C. 1953).
10. Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906, 911 (W.D. Va. 1950).
11. Ibid.
12. Id. at 910.
NOTES
had been numerous statutes enacted in an attempt to establish uniform
prison systems, the treatment accorded federal prisoners did not greatly
differ from one prison or "place" to another. Therefore Congress would
certainly not have placed such stress upon "place" if it had intended to
include federal prisoners within the terms of the act.
The Federal Tort Claims Act specifically excludes liability for in-
juries sustained due to assault and battery. This restriction is not ap-
plicable in the Sigmon case, where injury was negligently inflicted. How-
ever, such a restriction would apply to a great number of prison injuries,
particularly those caused by bodily mistreatment of the prisoner by prison
officials or those inflicted by fellow inmates.
The Federal Tort Claims Act also precludes liability where a discre-
tionary function is involved. 4 As will be discussed later, many of the
state jurisdictions consider penal duties as discretionary. Hence, in these
jurisdictions the federal government is not subject to liability for prison
inflicted injuries.
New York is the only state which consistently has waived its sov-
ereign immunity in the area of state tort liability for prison inflicted
injuries. In 1930 the New York Legislature enacted the Court of Claims
Ace' waiving the state's sovereign immunity and consenting to have its
liability determined by the courts. New York courts have allowed dam-
ages for injuries sustained due to the negligent acts of state officials.
The chief area in which damages have been adjudged in this field is that
of injuries negligently inflicted in prison workshops 6 or while attending
to menial prison chores.'
Despite the willingness of New York to waive its sovereign im-
munity to suit for penal inflicted injuries, most jurisdictions hold contra.
This is even the case in jurisdictions, such as North Carolina, where
statutory and constitutional provisions appear to provide ample protec-
tion for the rights of penal inmates. For example, the state constitution
of North Carolina requires that a proper jail structure be constructed
and that it be superintended in such a manner as to "secure the health
and comfort of the prisoner."" The North Carolina Legislature has
provided a standard which specifies cleanliness, ample food, water and
13. 62 Stat. 984, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (h) (1948).
14. 62 Stat. 984, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a) (1948).
15. N.Y. SEss. LAws 1930, ch. 585, § 3.
16. Duffy v. State, 197 Misc. 569, 94 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1950); Beale v. State, 46
N.Y.S.2d 824, (Ct. CI. 1944); Paige v. State, 245 App. Div. 126, 281 N.Y. Supp. 98
(1935) ; Scalia v. State, 147 Misc. 622, 264 N.Y. Supp. 327 (1933).
17. Nunally v. State, 197 Misc. 764, 94 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1950); White v. State,
23 N.Y.S.2d 526, 34 N.E.2d 896 (1940).
18. N.C. CoNsT. art. XI, § 6.
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fuel. However it should be noted that the state legislature has not pro-
vided a statute waiving the state's immunity to suit. Consequently suits
by penal inmates against the state0 or its county and municipal sub-
divisions" have been for naught, even where the presumedly protected
rights of the inmate have been flagrantly violated.
The sovereign immunity doctrine of the state is generally sufficient
to protect municipalities within the state.2 The principal theory con-
siders municipalities as subdivisions of the state22 and municipal officials,
while carrying out the corporate powers which have been delegated to the
municipality, as agents of the state.2" However, the courts occasionally
hesitate to use the strong, positive language of sovereign immunity
when seeking municipal immunity and rely upon other bases for denying
liability.24
In most cases the sovereign immunity of the state also serves as a
protection from personal liability for governmental officials while they
are acting within the scope of their power. The theory behind such
extension of sovereign immunity is that the only authority under which
the individual may act is that of the governmental unit, hence the offi-
cial is cloaked with the immunity of the sovereign.2" There is also a
strong belief that prison officials, especially, must have this protection to
enable them to discharge their duties adequately and fearlessly. How-
ever, some jurisdictions, although prohibiting governmental liability,
hold the official personally accountable for his misdeeds and subject to
19. Clodfelter v. State, 86 N.C. 51 (1882).
20. Parks v. Town of Princeton, 217 N.C. 361, 8 S.E.2d 217 (1940) ; Nichols v.
Town of Fountain, 165 N.C. 166, 80 S.E. 1059 (1914); Coley v. City of Statesville,
121 N.C. 301, 38 S.E. 482 (1897); Moffit v. City of Asheville, 103 N.C. 237, 9 S.E.
695 (1889). Manuge v. Commissioners of Cumberland County, 98 N.C. 9, 3 S.E. 826
(1887).
21. Two early North Carolina cases have been found which allowed successful
suits against municipalities to recover damage for penal injuries. Both cases relied
heavily upon the constitutional requirement to maintain the jail facilities and the
municipalities' failure to do so which resulted in death. However, neither case has
been followed nor cited as authority in recent cases.
22. 245 App. Div. 126, 281 N.Y. Supp. 98 (1935).
23. Alvord v. The Village of Richmond, 3 Ohio N.P. 136 (1896).
24. Decisions in the state of North Carolina alone are not uniform in this regard.
One case refuses municipal liability by classifying jail upkeep as a discretionary duty.
Parks v. Town of Princeton, 217 N.C. 361, 8 S.E.2d 217 (1940). Another case relies
upon the theory that wrongful acts by municipal officials are ultra vires. Nichols v.
Town of Fountain, 165 N.C. 166, 80 S.E. 1059 (1914). Still another case refuses to
hold the municipality liable because the prisoner was jailed for violation of a state
law. Hobbs v. City of Washington, 215 N.C. 298, 84 S.E. 391 (1915).
25. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949); Gurley v. Brown, 65 Nev.
245, 193 P.2d 693 (1948).
26. Lang v. Wood, 92 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
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civil suit.27 The indications are that the federal courts follow this pro-
cedure and will not protect officials, other than top-ranking officials,
who by acting illegally step outside the protection of their office.2" Such
ultra vires acts remove the protecting cloak of sovereign immunity and
subject the officials to suit in their individual capacities. 9
Even in jurisdictions which waive the states immunity to suit, the
civil status of the penal inmate may prevent him from recovering dam-
ages for injuries received while incarcerated. Due to the fact that a
prisoner is segregated from society, some jurisdictions hold that he is out-
side the protection of society's laws and is civilly dead." It is considered
the prerogative of the legislature to make the deprivation of a criminal's
civil rights a portion of the penalty imposed for the commission of the
crime. 1 Such a suspension of civil rights is commonly known as civil
death. 2 This practice, however, did not develop in the American com-
mon law, and where it exists in this country today it is the result of
legislative action.33 Such deprivation by a state legislature can have no
extra-territorial effect, but applies solely to the state in which the legisla-
tion is enacted and in which the crime is committed. 4
A prisoner who is under the disability of civil death is denied access
to the civil courts" and is required to await the restoration of his civil
rights before bringing suit for penal inflicted injuries. There is some
disagreement concerning the exact time of restoration of civil rights.
For example, it is generally agreed that civil rights should be restored
if a prisoner is conditionally pardoned or his sentence is commuted,0 and
some courts allow restoration upon the parole3" of an inmate. For a
27. Dunn v. Swanson, 217 N.C. 279, 7 S.E.2d 563 (1940); city of Topeka v.
Boutwell, 53 Kan. 20, 35 Pac. 819 (1894); Alvord v. Village of Richmond, 3 Ohio
N.P. 136 (1896); Stinnett v. City of Sherman, 43 S.W. 847 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897).
28. McCartney v. West Virginia, 156 F.2d 739 (4th Cir. 1946). See also Mitchell
v. Sharp 121 F.2d 964 (10th Cir. 1941).
29. Moffit v. City of Asheville, 103 N.C. 237, 9 S.E. 695 (1889).
30. Quick v. Western Ry., 207 Ala. 376, 92 So. 608 (1922) ; Smith v. Becker, 62
Kan. 541, 64 Pac. 70 (1901) ; Sullivan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 131 Me. 228,
160 Atl. 777 (1932) ; Knight v. Brown, 47 Me. 468 (1859).
31. li re Donnelly's Estates, 125 Cal. 417, 50 Pac. 61 (1899).
32. This term is an extension of the old English common law which held that
anyone convicted of a felony was under a bill of attainder. Such a person was required
to suffer forfeiture of all his property to the king, corruption of blood (inability to
heir or will property), and civil death (extinction of all civil rights). Today such a
bill of attainder is forbidden by the United States Constitution, art. I, § 9.
33. N.Y. PEN. LAw 510; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 76, § 19 (1930).
34. Presbury v. Hull, 34 Mo. 29 (1863) ; Panka v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 24 F.
Supp. 678 (N.D.N.Y. 1938).
35. Green v. State, 251 App. Div. 108, 295 N.Y. Supp. 672 (1938).
36. Lehrman v. State, 176 Misc. 1022, 29 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1941).
37. Platek v. Aderhold, 73 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1934).
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number of years the New York courts refused to allow such restoration
upon parole;38 they differentiated between parole and commutation by
pointing out that commutation results in the termination of the sentence
and the restoration of civil rights, while parole only provides for physi-
cal liberation contingent upon compliance with the terms of parole. How-
ever, in 1946 the New York Legislature amended the terms of the State
Penal Law39 to permit a prisoner to initiate suit while on parole.4 Those
jurisdictions which subject a penal inmate to civil death during sentence
usually protect his right to sue upon the termination of sentence by tolling
the statute of limitations. 1
A penal inmate who has circumvented the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity and whose civil rights have not been withdrawn may initiate a
suit for damages which were sustained during the period of incarcera-
tion. However, before successful consummation of such a suit, the in-
jury and circumstances surrounding its infliction must meet certain spe-
cified criteria imposed upon suits for penal inflicted injuries in the various
jurisdictions. One such criterion is that of "duty." Often the deciding
factor, determining whether the penal inmate shall have a right of action,
is the breach of an existing duty owed by the governmental unit or the
public official to the injured inmate. The general theory is that the state
and its penal officials owe a duty of safekeeping and protection from un-
lawful injury to those incarcerated.2 Where the law imposes such a duty
and failure to fulfill it results in injury, the injured inmate shall have a
right of action.43 Tyler v. Gobin." emphasizes that such a duty is actually
two-fold in nature. First, there is a duty owed by the public official to
the public to keep the prisoner and to deliver him for trial; second, there
is a duty owed by the public official to the prisoner to use ordinary and
reasonable care under the circumstances to keep him safe."3 When dis-
cussing the remedies available to prison inmates, only the latter of these
duties is important.
38. White v. State, 23 N.Y.S.2d, 34 N.E.2d 896 (1940); Lehrman v. State, 176
Misc. 1022, 29 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1941).
39. N.Y. PEN. LAw § 510.
40. Duffy v. State, 197 Misc. 569, 94 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1950); Grant v. State, 192
Misc. 45, 77 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1948).
41. Gordon v. Garrison, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948); Green v. State, 278
N.Y. 15, 14 N.E.2d 833 (1938); Moss v. Hyer, 114 W. Va. 584, 172 S.E. 795 (1934).
42. Asher v. Cabell, 50 Fed. 818 (5th Cir. 1892) ; Ratliff v. Stanley, 224 Ky. 819,
7 S.W.2d 230 (1928) ; Paige v. State, 245 App. Div. 126, 281 N.Y. Supp. 98 (1935).
43. Hixon v. Cupp, 5 Okla. 545, 49 Pac. 927 (1897).
44. 94 Fed. 48 (C.C.S.D. Ind. 1899).
45. This duty is compared by the court to a similar duty owed by the sheriff to
keep property safely, i.e., chattels and livestock.
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Hale v. Johwton40 presents a detailed discussion of the importance
of duty. The Tennessee court emphasizes the necessity of the duty be-
ing owed directly to the injured party in particular rather than to the
public in general. The injury suffered because of the breach of duty
must be of a different nature and extent than that to which all prisoners
are exposed, i.e., poor food and the discomfort of solitary confinement
is not sufficient for a cause of action.47
A factor which weighs heavily on the court's decision concerning the
existence or non-existence of a duty is the type or category of conduct
which causes injury to the penal inmate."8 It must be determined if the
jurisdiction in question considers the care of penal inmates as a govern-
mental, discretionary or ministerial function. Basically, the care and
maintenance of prisoners is said to be a governmental or discretionary
service for which no private action accrues to an individual who sus-
tains an injury resulting therefrom.49  These findings are based to a
great degree upon the duty of the state to protect the public safety, public
health, and public morals"0 in the exercise of its vast police power."
Ministerial services, on the other hand, are usually of an operational na-
ture, the more menial tasks assigned to subordinate officials. 2 How-
ever, it is often most difficult to determine just where the line of de-
marcation is between the two categories. Also, it should be pointed out
that merely having a service classified as ministerial does not guarantee
liability, for if it is one solely for the public benefit, some jurisdictions
will refuse liability.r
3
A few courts allow a right of action, against the public officials in-
volved, for injuries inflicted upon penal inmates where the injury was
46. 140 Tenn. 182, 203 S.W. 949 (1918).
47. Williams v. Adams, 3 Allen 171 (Mass. 1861); Hale v. Johnston, 140 Tenn.
182, 203 S.W. 949 (1918).
48. McIlhenney v. City of Wilmington, 127 N.C. 146, 37 S.E. 187 (1900). For an
excellent discussion of this general area, see Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15
(1953), where the Court went into great detail to point out that discretionary functions
include more than the initiation of programs or activities. Such functions are wide in
latitude and include most, if not all, determinations made by executives and administrators
on a planning rather than on an operational level. Matters of professional judgment
made by qualified and competent persons are certainly included within this category.
49. Gentry v. Town of Hot Springs, 227 N.C. 665, 44 S.E.2d 85 (1947) ; Liming
v. Holman, 10 N.J. Misc. 582, 160 AtI. 32 (1932); Alvord v. Village of Richmond,
3 Ohio N.P. 136 (1896).
50. Carty v. Winooski, 78 Vt. 104, 62 AtI. 45 (1905).
51. White v. Board of Comm'rs, 129 Ind. 396, 28 N.E. 846 (1891); Alvord v.
Village of Richmond, 3 Ohio N.P. 136 (1896).
52. Gurley v. Brown, 65 Nev. 245, 193 P.2d 693 (1948) ; Hipp v. Farrell, 173 N.C.
167, 91 S.E. 831 (1917).
53. Hipp v. Farrell, 173 N.C. 167, 91 S.E. 831 (1917).
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caused by the breach of a ministerial task. 4 These courts consider jail
upkeep to be a ministerial function. In some jurisdictions, even where
the menial task of jail upkeep is considered as discretionary and liability
is denied in suits against governmental units, dicta seems to indicate that
the prison officials who inflicted injuries upon penal inmates would be
personally liable for such acts. 5
A marked distinction can be seen in the courts' treatment of the
term "discretionary" in suits against governmental units for injuries
received in penal institutions and its treatment of the same term in con-
nection with injuries received in other institutions such as government
hospitals. In the latter type of institution the discretion is that of de-
ciding if the patient should be admitted or if the operation should be per-
formed. Subsequent acts which negligently cause injury are ministerial,
and hence a suit may be instigated." As discussed, this is seldom the
case in penal institutions.
If it is established that a duty does exist, there still remains the
problem of determining the standard of care which must be met to avoid
a breach of the existing duty. The usual standard has been specified as
"the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care to protect the prisoner." 7
In assisting the jury to arrive at what should be considered reasonable
under penal conditions, the instructions of the court have varied con-
siderably. For example, the New York Court, when discussing the
standard of care required in the operation of prison industries, pointed
out that since the penal inmate had no choice to do anything except as
he was ordered and did not voluntarily assume any of the risks or liabili-
ties of his occupation, the state should actually maintain a higher standard
of safety for the prisoner's protection than that resting upon the em-
ployer of free labor in the industries of the state.58  However, the court
in a later case59 held that, the state must comply with the same standard
of care as its citizens engaged in similar employment in industry. Al-
though no case has been found which holds the state subject to a lesser
standard of care than that required of civilian industry, such might
54. I-ixon v. Cupp, 5 Okla. 545, 49 Pac. 927 (1897) ; Clark v. Kelly, 101 W. Va.
650, 133 S.E. 365 (1926).
55. White v. Board of Comm'rs, 129 Ind. 396, 28 N.E. 846 (1891) ;Mcllhenney v.
City of Wilmington, 127 N.C. 146, 37 S.E. 187 (1900); Alvord v. Village of Rich-
mond, 3 Ohio N.P. 136 (1896).
56. United States v. Grey, 199 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952) ; Costley v. United States,
181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950).
57. Ratliff v. Stanley, 224 Ky. 819, 7 S.W.2d 230 (1928) ; O'Dell v. Goodsell, 149
Neb. 261, 30 N.W.2d 906 (1948) ; Riggs v. German, 81 Wash. 128, 142 Pac. 479 (1914).
58. Scalia v. State, 147 Misc. 622, 264 N.Y. Supp. 327 (1933). See also Nunally
v. State, 197 Misc. 764, 94 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1950).
59. Beale v. State, 46 N.Y.S.2d 824 (Ct. Cl. 1944).
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actually be the case where prison officials are given wide latitude in the
performance of prison duties. In suits against the personal liability of
prison officials, some jurisdictions hold that the prison officials shall be
presumed to be exercising the necessary reasonable care, and this pre-
sumption must be refuted before an inmate may successfully pursue an
action for injury."
In determining whether the injured inmate has a cause of action
against the prison official in his individual capacity, courts rely heavily
upon the malice and intent behind the act which precipitated injury. Al-
though cases may be found which hold that such malice or intent is im-
material when determining the liability of top-ranking prison officials6
or the governmental unit,6 2 it is of utmost importance when determining
the personal liability of lesser officials. The penal inmate has a much
better chance of recovery if his injuries were sustained by an intentional
tort. For example, some cases specifically refuse to allow a right of
action against the prison official in his personal capacity because no
malice or intent to do bodily harm was proved.63 The case of Hale v.
Johnston64 provides an excellent discussion of this area. The court held
that a common law action may be maintained against a public official
for misfeasance or nonfeasance in the discharge of a ministerial duty
only if the elements of willfulness and malice are present. The court also
indicates that even if the duty breached were discretionary, liability
would lie if the official acted with malice and corruptly.
A few cases may be found where a suit for penal inflicted injuries
was successfully brought against the personal liability of penal officials
for acts which were not done intentionally or with malice. However,
successful litigation for damages caused by negligent torts is rare. In
those jurisdictions which do permit such actions the basis for the prison
official's liability generally rests on the fact that a dangerous condition
existed, the official involved had adequate knowledge of its existence
and yet failed to exercise the ordinary and reasonable care necessary to
protect the prisoner from injury. This is particularly true in the case
of injuries inflicted at the hands of "kangaroo courts."65  A good ex-
60. Riggs v. German, 81 Wash. 128, 142 Pac. 479 (1914).
61. Lang v. Wood, 92 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
62. Iit re Moore, 97 Ind. App. 492, 187 N.E. 219 (1933); Nichols v. Town of
Fountain, 165 N.C. 166, 80 S.E. 1059 (1914); McIlhenney v. City of Wilmington, 127
N.C. 146, 37 S.E. 187 (1900).
63. Williams v. Adams, 3 Allen 171 (Mass. 1861); Moye v. McLawhorn, 208
N.C. 812, 182 S.E. 493 (1935) ; Richardson v. Capwell, 63 Utah 616, 176 Pac. 205 (1918).
64. 140 Tenn. 182, 203 S.W. 949 (1918).
65. Ratliff v. Stanley, 224 Ky. 918, 7 S.W.2d 230 (1928); Taylor v. Slaughter,
171 Okla. 152, 42 P.2d 235 (1935) ; Hixon v. Cupp, 50 Okla. 545, 49 Pac. 927 (1897);
Eberhart v. Murphy, 110 Wash. 168, 188 Pac. 17 (1920).
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ample of the importance which the courts of today, when dealing with
negligent torts in this area, place upon the fact that the prison official
had "knowledge" of the existing circumstances can be seen by comparing
two Washington cases involving "kangaroo court" injuries. The court
in Riggs v. Germani6 refused to allow recovery for such injury. The de-
cision condoned the "kangaroo court" practice and further emphasized
that the testimony was insufficient to prove the sheriff had actual knowl-
edge of the existing conditions. However, the later case of Eberhart v.
Murphy7 repudiated Riggs and stated the modern trend of thought. Af-
ter expressing disagreement with the previous case concerning the place
of "kangaroo courts" in the American penal system, the court emphasized
that in the present case there had been a past history of brutal treatment
and that the sheriff had adequate knowledge thereof.
Other courts have permitted successful suits against prison officials
for negligent torts to inmates where the inmate was taken from the
sheriff and killed by a lynch mob,68 where the inmate was injured by an-
other inmate who was violently insane,"9 and where the inmate was in-
jured due to the failure of a superior prison official to perform certain
lesser ministerial duties."0 Two cases7 subject a penal official to per-
sonal tort liability because of failure to properly discharge incompetent
subordinates. Admittedly, this is a novel doctrine in the area of penal
injuries. The first of these cases" relied upon the principles of agency
and held that since the sheriff was responsible for reasonable care in the
selection of deputies, he was also responsible for the negligence of these
deputies. This is contrary to the great weight of authority in this field,
for numerous cases specifically reject liability based on agency principals
or respondeat superior.73 The second case 4 specifically rejects the agency
principal and specifies that it is not the wrongful act of the subordinate
which makes the superior liable, but it is the superior's failure to remove
his subordinate, after knowledge of his incompetence, which imputes
66. 81 Wash. 128, 142 Pac. 479 (1914).
67. 110 Wash. 168, 188 Pac. 17 (1920).
68. Ex Parte Jenkins, 25 Ind. App. 532, 58 N.E. 560 (1900).
69. Moxley v. Roberts, 43 S.W. 482 (Ky. Ct. App. 1897); Dunn v. Swanson,
217 N.C. 279, 7 S.E.2d 563 (1940).
70. Hunt v. Rowton, 142 Okla. 181, 288 Pac. 342 (1930); Clark v. Kelly, 101
W. Va. 650, 133 S.E. 365 (1926).
71. Fernelius v. Pierce, 22 Cal. 2d 226, 138 P.2d 12 (1943); Kusah v. McCorkle,
100 Wash. 318, 170 Pac. 1023 (1918).
72. Kusah v. McCorkle, supra note 71.
73. Martin v. Moore, 99 Md. 41, 57 AtI. 671 (1904); Gentry v. Town of Hot
Springs, 227 N.C. 665, 44 S.E.2d 85 (1947) ; Clodfelter v. State, 86 N.C. 51, (1882);
Hale v. Johnston, 140 Tenn. 182, 203 S.W. 949 (1918).
74. Fernelius v. Pierce, supra note 71.
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liability to the subordinate for injuries caused as a result of such in-
competence. The court further held that failure of the superior to act by
removing his subordinate was, in effect, an instrumentality in the hands
of the superior, himself, and he must be liable for the use, or lack of use,
of the instrumentality within his control.
Another basic problem which confronts an injured penal inmate,
particularly in those jurisdictions where suit must be instigated against
a lesser prison official, because sovereign immunity protects the state and
top penal officials, is that of the possible lack of financial responsibility
of the official against whom the suit must be brought."5 A remedy is to
no avail unless there are means by which it can be satisfied. For this
reason some jurisdictions require penal officials and employees to be
bonded. These surety requirements are generally provided by statute
and provide that the bond of such official shall be subject to suit for any
injury which results from the breach of a duty prescribed upon the offi-
cial by law."'
Some jurisdictions provide statutory means by which an injured
penal inmate may seek at least partial recourse for his injuries. For ex-
ample, it is of interest to note that some states provide by statute for in-
termediary bodies to assist the prisoner in the protection of his rights.
West Virginia provides a prisoner's committee which may sue or be
sued ;17 while in California, the Adult Authority Board/ 8 if it thinks jus-
tice requires, may restore any of the prisoner's civil rights with the ex-
ception of the right to act as trustee, hold public office, exercise the
privilege of an elector or give a general power of attorney.
By the terms of the Prison Industries Fund,7 the United States
Attorney General may promulgate regulations under which Federal pris-
oners who have special skills, or whose behavior is exemplary, may be
paid for the labors they perform while incarcerated. In the event of in-
jury to these prisoners the act provides for compensation to the inmates
or their dependents. This compensation is limited to no greater amount
75. Courts have emphasized the importance of the surety in the redress of penal
inflicted injuries by pointing out that, even in the case of a lesser official, the sureties
"are the sponsors of his integrity as an officer while acting as such." Taylor v.
Slaughter, 171 Okla. 152, 153, 42 P.2d 235, 236 (1935). "It is poor law that would
permit the sheriff . . . to throw away his badge and ply his billy with deadly effect."
Price v. Honeycutt, 216 N.C. 270, 274, 4 S.E.2d 611, 614 (1939). The measure of damages
against the surety is usually considered to be just compensation for actual injury, hence
exemplary damages should not fall upon the bondsman. Hixon v. Cupp, 5 Okla. 545,
4 Pac. 927 (1897).
76. NEB. REv. STAT. § 11-112 (1943) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 2224 (1936).
77. W. VA. CODE ch. 28, art, 5, § 33-36 (1931).
78. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600-02 (1949).
79. 62 Stat. 852, 18 U.S.C. 4126 (1948).
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than that provided in the Federal Employees' Compensation Act."0
For several years the state of California provided for the compen-
sation of prison-inflicted injuries through the normal state workmen's
compensation laws if the prisoner was injured under certain conditions.
The California Road Camp Bill8 permits prisoners to work on the state
highways for limited compensation, but does not specify that an employee-
employer relationship exists. However, until 194182 California courts so
interpreted the law and permitted prison inmates injured while employed
under the terms of this act to pursue action against the State Industrial
Accident Commission successfully.83
In summary, the subject of a penal inmate's recourse for prison-
inflicted injuries is one of controversy. Some jurisdictions defend the
refusal to compensate for injury on the ground that such would be a
severe blow to the state's authority. They point out that public officials
must be free to exercise their duties without fear of harassment by civil
suit, and that firmness and strict treatment is the only language most
penal inmates understand. Those who adhere to this school of thought
further suggest that it would be most dangerous and unfair to subject
the public taxpayers to this financial burden." This thought is well sum-
marized in Brown v. Town of Goyandotte" where the court points out
that governmental subdivisions and the duties of their employees are not
designed for private gain but for the "public weal." If liability were
permitted, "it would be impossible to say where [the taxpayer's] liability
would end or how onerous would be the burden laid upon those who sus-
tain their existence.""8
Other jurisdictions point out that a prisoner is not a slave, and that
governmental authority is limited to authority to incarcerate one who
80. It should also be pointed out that the provisions of this act are applicable to
less than one-third of all Federal prisoners.
81. CAL. AcTs 1923, ch. 316, at 667.
82. The California Legislature by Stats. 1941, ch. 106, § 15, specified that an
employee-employer relationship would not exist between the state and its prisoners.
83. California Highway Comm., v. Industrial Accident Comm., 200 Cal. 44, 251 Pac.
808 (1926).
84. The New York precedent, which subjects the state to liability for negligently
inflicted injuries to penal inmates, raises the problem of the burden this practice places
upon the taxpayers of the state. In a most helpful report, the New York Solicitor
General has pointed out that during the last three years, from 1955 to 1958, there
have been only five judgments in favor of prisoners. Each of these awards resulted from
injuries sustained while the inmate was engaged at prison labor. The total damages
amounted to $49,900. (This report is contained in a letter from New York Solicitor
General, Paxton Blair, November 13, 1948, on file in Business Office, INDIANA LAW
JOURNAL).
85. 34 W. Va. 299, 12 S.E. 707 (1890).
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perpetrates a wrong against society. It does not include the right to harm
his person with impunity. "A man does not cease to be a human being
because he is convicted and is imprisoned. . . . Although occupying a
felon's cell, he may experience as great mental anguish over the dis-
figurement of his person as if he were a free man, and the law is not so
inhuman as to deny him compensation in damages against anyone who
may have negligently inflicted an injury upon him.""7
To say the least, the prison inmate is in an unusual position. In
many respects he is helpless to help himself. If he is forced to await
completion of his sentence before initiating suit, he finds that his proof
has become stale. Such a procedure also has little or no deterrent effect.
The very fact that he is a penal inmate and that most, if not all, of his
witnesses are fellow inmates is a decided disadvantage.88 If the suit
must be brought against the employee who has actually harmed the
prisoner, and not against that authority which incarcerated him, the fi-
nancial responsibility of the defendant will often make such a suit highly
impractical.
The penal inmate who is injured faces two tremendous obstacles-
sovereign immunity and civil death. It would be inequitable to propose
that a felon should be granted civil recourse to the courts, when his fel-
low citizens outside the prison walls are not. He has committed a wrong
against society. Yet in that small area where the prisoner, helpless as
he is to prevent such treatment, is willfully and maliciously subjected to
inhuman treatment, it is most unjust to allow him to go uncompensated
and to leave his antagonist free to continue the assault.
PRICE-FIXING WITHIN THE BARBER INDUSTRY
The barber trade faces problems in the realm of self-government
and self-regulation which can best be solved by a system of fixed indus-
try prices. The problems which barber groups can advantageously elimi-
nate through a fixed price system are temporary but costly price wars;
competition from low cost, price-cutting shops; and prices which in-
adequately or unsatisfactorily cover the personal income needs of local
barbers. Often, however, price-fixing methods employed by barber
groups conflict with social and economic policies embodied in state anti-
87. St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. v. Hydrick, 109 Ark. 231, 234, 160 S.W. 196, 199 (1913).
88. The credibility of such individuals is always subject to serious examination, and
in many cases they may actually be afraid to talk.
